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Size distribution and anti-trust
Abstract : Extensive literature notwithstanding, e¤ects of the size distribution of …rms
on consumers’ surplus and on social welfare leaves room for further exploration. In
this paper we discover that size distribution imposes two counter-balancing e¤ects
on aggregate surplus of the industry : [i] even distribution of …rm sizes typically
facilitates tacit collusion compared to slightly uneven distribution, whilst [ii] very
uneven distribution resembles monopoly. The trade-o¤ between these two counter-
forces can make the overall welfare e¤ect of …rms’ size distribution (given a …xed
number of …rms) non-monotone in the degree of concentration.
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1 Introduction
Concentration indices are commonly used by various antitrust authorities all over the
world in order to measure how anti-competitive the market is. Game-theoretic microeco-
nomics largely supports the prediction given by these indices as far as the number of …rms
is concerned. That is, the more …rms coexist in a market, [1] the less market power each
…rm can exercise in static oligopolistic equilibria, and [2] the harder it is to sustain tacit
collusion as a subgame perfect equilibrium when the market is repeated, be it Cournot or
Bertrand or anything in between.
In fact, however, concentration indices measure two things inseparably. They re‡ect
not only the number of …rms, but also their size distribution as well. Namely, if the number
of …rms is the same, the more uneven their sizes are, the higher the concentration indices
are. However, from a theoretical viewpoint, it is less straightforward whether uneven
size distributions necessarily make the market less competitive as opposed to more evenly
sized oligopoly.
Existing studies analysing the exercise of market power by a priori heterogeneous
…rms include Harrington (1989 ; 1991), Lambson (1994 ; 1995), and Rothschild (1999),
inter alia. Harrington (1989) considers …rms with heterogeneous discount factors and
relates their di¤erent degrees of myopia to the well-known e¤ects in terms of bargaining
power. Lambson (1994 ; 1995) characterises …rms with unequally sized capacity and the
e¤ects of their size distribution on the subgame-perfect sustainability of tacit collusion
with optimal punishment à la Abreu (1986 ; 1988) and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti
(1986). In Harrington (1991) and Rothschild (1999), …rm heterogeneity is modelled in
terms of heterogeneous production costs.
Technically, our analysis in this paper is somewhere in between Lambson’s capacity
approach, and Harrington’s and Rothschild’s cost approach. More philosophically, however,
we have a slightly di¤erent view from most of the existing contributions in the following
sense. In our comparative statics, we …x the industry’s aggregate production capacity
(de…ned in terms of the industry-wide marginal cost function) and divide it between …rms
at various parametrised proportions. This contrasts with the so-far more popular view
of comparing each …rm’s cost (or capacity as a special case thereof) parameters directly,
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without focusing central attention on the industry’s aggregate production capacity.
The reason why we take this somewhat unconventional approach is due to our interest
in associating our theoretical analysis to practical policy implications. Namely, when
discussing concentration and various ways of its indexation, what interests us (or policy
makers in general) the most is the distribution of production capacity across …rms, no less
than each …rm’s individual capacity or cost levels. For this purpose, we …nd our approach
to be the most natural and also technically the most straightforward.
We show that size distribution produces two opposite e¤ects on aggregate surplus of
the industry : [i] even distribution of …rm sizes typically facilitates tacit collusion compared
to slightly uneven distribution, whilst [ii] very uneven distribution resembles monopoly.
For a given number of …rms, the trade-o¤ between these two forces can make the overall
welfare e¤ect of …rms’ size distribution non-monotone in the degree of concentration of
the industry.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we lay out and analyse
our basic duopoly model, where we mainly concentrate on Bertrand duopoly which turns
out to be the simplest although the gist of our analysis is applicable to other forms
of oligopolistic markets. Then in section 3 we present a simple illustrative example to
develop concrete intuition as to the non-monotonicity of the e¤ects of size distribution on
industry-aggregate welfare. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Bertrand duopoly
2.1 Stage game
Consider an industry where the industry-wide aggregate marginal cost function is M [Q] ,
where M [Q] > 0 and M 0[Q] > 0 for all Q ¸ 0. There are two …rms competing in this
industry, referred to as …rm 1 and …rm 2 henceforth. Their capacity ratio is k : (1¡ k) ,
that is, their respective marginal cost functions are
m1[q1] =M
·
q1
k
¸
; m2[q2] =M
·
q2
1¡ k
¸
;
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where 0 < k < 1. There are no …xed costs irrespective of k .
Assume for simplicity that these two …rms are perfectly substitutable suppliers facing
the common, industry-wide inverse demand function D¡1[Q] , such that D¡1[0] > M [0]
and (D¡1)0[Q] < 0 for all Q ¸ 0 . These …rms are simultaneous-move price-setters.
2.2 Full collusion in a Bertrand supergame
Now suppose that the stage game de…ned in 2.1 is in…nitely repeated with the discount
factor ± which is common between the two …rms. Obviously, whenever there exists a QF 2
argmax
q
Z q
Q=0
³
D¡1[Q]¡M [Q]
´
dQ , if the two …rms are able to sustain tacit collusion at
the monopoly level
p1 = p2 = PF
where PF = D¡1[QF ] , selling
q1 = kQF ; q2 = (1¡ k)QF ;
then this is the most pro…table outcome from the two …rms’ point of view, exercising their
market power in full, earning nett pro…ts (per stage game)
¼1 = k¦F ; ¼2 = (1¡ k)¦F
where ¦F =
Z QF
Q=0
³
D¡1[Q]¡M [Q]
´
dQ .
We now examine whether this monopoly pricing is sustainable by trigger strategies.
As an instrument for sustaining tacit collusion, consider the one-shot Nash reversion with
the following static Bertrand-Nash equilibrium as a threat point. Note that there can
be multiple static Bertrand-Nash equilibria, but that there is one with zero nett payo¤s
for either …rm.1 This static equilibrium, denoted by p1 = p2 = PBN hereinafter, satis…esZ QBN
Q=0
³
D¡1[Q]¡M [Q]
´
dQ = 0 , where PBN = D¡1[QBN ] .
Let ¦[k ;PF ] denote …rm 1’s deviation pro…t, i.e., the maximum one-shot nett pro…t
attainable for …rm 1 given p2 = PF . Provided that ¦[k ;PF ] ¸ k¦F , …rm 1 has an
incentive to remain in tacit collusion if and only if
± ¸ 1¡ k¦F
¦[k ;PF ]
:
1This penal code automatically ensures the “security level punishment”, as de…ned by Lambson (1987).
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Likewise, let ¦[1¡ k ;PF ] denote …rm 2’s deviation pro…t given p1 = PF . Provided that
¦[1¡ k ;PF ] ¸ (1¡ k)¦F …rm 2 has an incentive to remain in tacit collusion if and only
if
± ¸ 1¡ (1¡ k)¦F
¦[1¡ k ;PF ] :
The minimum admissible discount factor in order to sustain tacit collusion is therefore
± = max
(
1¡ k¦F
¦[k ;PF ]
; 1¡ (1¡ k)¦F
¦[1¡ k ;PF ]
)
because, to sustain tacit collusion, the incentives to remain in collusion should be satis…ed
for both …rms. Figure 1 illustrates the two functions 1¡ k¦F
¦[k ;PF ]
and 1¡ (1¡ k)¦F
¦[1¡ k ;PF ] ,
which obviously are mirror images of each other with respect to k =
1
2
.
Proposition 1 : ²If 1¡ k¦F
¦[k ;PF ]
(and thus 1¡ (1¡ k)¦F
¦[1¡ k ;PF ] as well) happens to have
a local maximum at k =
1
2
, then ± also has a local maximum at k =
1
2
. However,
insofar as these two functions are smooth, they have a zero slope at k =
1
2
and so
does ± , which implies that a small departure of k away from
1
2
entails no …rst-order
e¤ect on ± .
² In all other cases, ± has a local minimum at k = 1
2
. Furthermore, whenever 1 ¡
k¦F
¦[k ;PF ]
(and thus 1¡ (1¡ k)¦F
¦[1¡ k ;PF ] as well) has a non-zero slope at k =
1
2
, the local
minimum of ± at this point is a downward-dipping kink, hence any local departure
of k away from
1
2
entails a …rst-order increase in ± .
Obviously, the latter not the former is the generic case, as drawn in Figure 1 (the local
slopes of the two functions may be opposite from those in the diagram ; insofar as they
are non-zero our generic observation upholds).
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Figure 1 : Minimum collusive discount factor near k =
1
2
.
-
k
6
± (thickened locus)
1
2
1¡ k¦F
¦[k ;PF ]
1¡ (1¡ k)¦F
¦[1¡ k ;PF ]
In economic terms this proposition (its second half, the generic case) suggests that unequalising
the size distribution of the …rms away from the 50 - 50 split can help destabilise tacit
collusion and thereby contribute to welfare, in spite of the fact that it increases most of
the commonly used concentration indices. The intuition to this proposition can be best
obtained by means of an example, as the one in section 3.
2.3 Partial collusion in a Bertrand supergame
When the discount factor ± is too low to sustain full collusion as described in 2.2, there
can still be sustained some tacit price collusion that is not as pro…table. This type of
collusion is often referred to as partial collusion. In the spirit of “tacit collusion” where
…rms are not under any explicitly collusive agreement such as side payments and hence
are to share pro…ts according to their sales share, we focus on those outcomes where the
…rms share the market according to their capacity ratio k : (1¡ k) .2 In order for the two
…rms to collude at a price PT 2 (PBN ; PF ) with quantities q1 = kQT and q2 = (1¡ k)QT
2Size asymmetry between the two …rms in our model could generally give rise to two dimensions
in which tacit price collusion can be “partial.” One is the level of the collusive price, which is the
dimension ordinarily considered when discussing partial collusion. The other dimension is the reshu-ing
of quantities between the two …rms, given any collusive price level ; between equally sized …rms the equal
quantity shares would always be the best sustainable and the most pro…table collusive con…guration,
whilst between unequally sized …rms the quantity shares proportional to their sizes may not be the best
sustainable albeit unambiguously the most pro…table whenever sustainable. Fixing the quantity ratio at
k : (1 ¡ k) is for us to concentrate on the former dimension not the latter.
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where PT = D¡1[QT ] , analogously to section 2.2, the discount factor must satisfy
± ¸ max
(
1¡ k¦
¤[PT ]
¦[k ;PT ]
; 1¡ (1¡ k)¦
¤[PT ]
¦[1¡ k ;PT ]
)
where ¦¤[PT ] =
Z QT
Q=0
³
D¡1[Q]¡M [Q]
´
dQ , and ¦[k ;PT ] and ¦[1 ¡ k ;PT ] denote the
deviation pro…ts for …rm 1 and …rm 2, respectively, given the other …rm conforming to
PT .
We are interested in the most pro…table partial collusion given ± 2 (0; ±) and k .
Letting
PT [± ; k] =
arg
PT
(
1¡ k¦
¤[PT ]
¦[k ;PT ]
= ±
)
;
PT [± ; 1¡ k] = argPT
(
1¡ (1¡ k)¦
¤[PT ]
¦[1¡ k ;PT ] = ±
)
;
the most pro…table partially collusive price can be de…ned as
P ¤[± ; k] = min fPT [± ; k] ; PT [± ; 1¡ k]g :
The “dual” of Proposition 1 is hereby as follows.
Proposition 2 : ²If PT [± ; k] (and thus PT [± ; 1¡ k] as well) happens to have a local
minimum at k =
1
2
, then P ¤[± ; k] also has a local minimum at k =
1
2
. However,
insofar as the two functions PT [± ; k] and PT [± ; 1¡ k] are smooth, they have a zero
slope at k =
1
2
and so does P ¤[± ; k] , which implies that a small departure of k away
from
1
2
entails no …rst-order e¤ect on P ¤[± ; k] .
² In all other cases, P ¤[± ; k] has a local maximum at k = 1
2
. Furthermore, whenever
PT [± ; k] (and thus PT [± ; 1 ¡ k] as well) has a non-zero slope at k = 1
2
, the local
maximum of P ¤[± ; k] at this point is a upward-kinked ridge, hence any local departure
of k away from
1
2
entails a …rst-order decrease in P ¤[± ;k] .
The generic case, the second item of Proposition 2, is illustrated in Figure 2 (as in Figure
1, the local slopes of the two functions may be opposite from those in the diagram ; insofar
as they are non-zero our generic observation upholds).
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Figure 2 : Highest partially collusive price near k =
1
2
.
-
k
6
P ¤[± ; k] (thickened locus)
1
2
PT [± ; k] PT [± ; 1¡ k]
2.4 Note on general oligopoly
Essentially, the same logic as deriving Propositions 1 and 2 could be invoked whether
the market is Bertrand or Cournot or a more general game with upward-sloping supply
functions (see Klemperer and Meyer, 1989). Namely, as far as collusive stability is
concerned, unequalising …rm sizes can help destroy tacit collusion and thereby contribute
to industry-wide total surplus, de…ned as the sum of …rms’ nett pro…ts and the consumers’
surplus.
3 An illustrative example
For concrete intuition, consider the simple marginal cost functionM [Q] =
Q
2
(we continue
to adopt the same notation as in section 2). Assume no …xed costs for production, and
the industry-wide inverse demand D¡1[Q] = 5¡Q .
The static zero-pro…t Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is p1 = p2 = PBN = 1 , with
quantities q1 = 4k , q2 = 4(1¡ k) .
Full collusion is attained at the monopoly price p1 = p2 = PF = 3 , with fully collusive
quantities q1 = 2k , q2 = 2(1 ¡ k) , and fully collusive pro…ts ¦F = 5. The deviation
pro…ts from full collusion are ¦[k ; 3] = 6¡ 1
k
for …rm 1 and ¦[1¡ k ; 3] = 6¡ 1
1¡ k for
…rm 2. Since ¦[k ; 3] >< k¦F i¤ k
>
<
1
5
and likewise ¦[1¡ k ; 3] >< (1 ¡ k)¦F i¤ k <>
4
5
,
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the minimum admissible discount factor ± for full collusion is
± =
8>>>>>><>>>>>:
1¡ (1¡ k)¦F
¦[1¡ k ;PF ] 0 < k <
1
5
;
max
(
1¡ k¦F
¦[k ;PF ]
; 1¡ (1¡ k)¦F
¦[1¡ k ;PF ]
)
1
5
· k · 4
5
;
1¡ k¦F
¦[k ;PF ]
4
5
< k < 1 ;
which can be further computed as
± =
8>><>>>:
(4¡ 5k)k
5¡ 6k 0 < k ·
3¡ p3
6
;
1
2
< k <
3 +
p
3
6
;
(5k ¡ 1)(1¡ k)
6k ¡ 1
3¡ p3
6
< k · 1
2
;
3 +
p
3
6
· k < 1:
The top diagram in Figure 3 plots ± against k . Clearly from the diagram, ± has the global
in…ma ± & 0 at k & 0 and at k % 1 (the two open-ends), the local minimum ± = 3
8
at k =
1
2
, and the global maxima ± =
4
9
at k =
1
3
and at k =
2
3
(the …lled dots in the
diagram).
Hence, for any ± 2 (0; 4
9
) , the highest sustainable collusive price P ¤[± ; k] is (globally)
minimised at k =
1
3
and at k =
2
3
, locally maximised at k =
1
2
µ
this local maximum
becomes an interval (“plateau”) when
3
8
< ± <
4
9
¶
, and obviously, globally maximised at
monopoly (in the neighbourhoods k & 0 and k % 1). This is illustrated in the middle
diagram of Figure 3, where those critical size distributions at which the most pro…table
partial collusion coincides with full collusion are marked with k¤ and k¤.
Therefore, dually, welfare taking into account the sustainability of tacit partial collusion
is (globally) maximised at k =
1
3
and k =
2
3
, locally minimised at k =
1
2
, and obviously,
globally minimised at monopoly (in the neighbourhoods k & 0 and k % 1), as illustrated
in the bottom diagram of Figure 3.
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Figure 3 : Critical discount factor, collusive price and welfare
plotted against productive capacity
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have established the possibly non-monotone relation between the degree
of concentration due to size distribution of oligopolistic …rms, and the resulting social
welfare taking into account the (subgame perfect) sustainability of tacit price collusion in
a repeated market game. When the market is highly concentrated with one …rm being
overwhelmingly larger than its competitor(s) in terms of production capacity (measured by
the marginal cost structure), the large …rm can exercise virtual monopoly power, whereby
such extreme concentration tends to contribute negatively to welfare. However, while
size distribution is not extreme, a slight perturbation away from the equally distributed
capacity tends to help destabilise tacit collusion and hence contribute positively to resulting
welfare. These two counterforces entail the aforesaid non-monotonicity feature.
This …nding has a very direct relevance to policy making, and more general assessment
of so-called market power in a practical sense. Concentration indices, albeit extremely
commonly used by various policy makers, not only mismeasure the market power in its true
welfare implications, but they do so non-monotonically. An alternative “index” taking
into account the aforementioned two countere¤ects is highly desired, which is indeed our
future research subject.
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